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IN CONSPICUOUS TERMS—ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS FOR THE MODERN
REASONABLE APP USER
MICHELLE DUNBAR*
ABSTRACT
Two recent decisions regarding the validity of arbitration
agreements in mobile apps have come to opposite conclusions
despite utilizing the same legal standard and concerning the same
app—Uber. While the Federal Arbitration Act strongly favors the
validity and importance of arbitration agreements, it appears
that judge’s subjectivity based on common knowledge and understanding of apps is influencing the outcome of cases concerning
the validity of these arbitration agreements. To the modern app
user, are these terms really inconspicuous? For businesses, this
could mean that instead of competing in an already saturated app
market by enhancing their design and integrating branding into
their mobile app’s user interface, they may have to concern themselves more with compromising their branding strategy to comply
with a legal standard that demands the terms to be the most conspicuous standard to include the common knowledge and understanding of app users into the perspective of the reasonable app
users that courts use to analyze the conspicuousness of terms. By
encompassing this heightened knowledge, reasonable access to
terms, rather than the level of conspicuousness of terms, should
suffice for putting a user on inquiry notice. Such a standard allowing for reasonable access should both accurately reflect the current knowledge and allow for further item to the user. This Note
proposes a potential redefined advancements in the understanding
of mobile technology.

* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, Class of 2020. Master of International Business, University of Florida, 2017. B.S., Business Administration–
Finance, University of Florida, 2016. The author would like to thank her parents,
David and Cindy Dunbar, as well as Carter Lawson, each for their invaluable
guidance and unwavering love and support. Additional thanks to the Staff and
Editorial Board of the William & Mary Business Law Review for all of their
assistance in preparing this Note for publication.
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INTRODUCTION
The standard for determining the validity of arbitration
agreements in apps and new digital technology is unclear. The
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) expresses “a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements.”1 However, by using a reasonable
person standard to determine (i) whether someone has received
notice of an arbitration agreement and (ii) whether the arbitration agreement has been agreed to in smartphone applications,
courts allow subjective biases to creep into this inquiry which
may vary from judge to judge, making the standard unclear.2 If
the FAA reads so liberally in favor of arbitration, how is it that
the judicial interpretation has differed on the validity of arbitration terms for the same company’s app and terms?3
Two recent cases, Cullinane v. Uber Technologies, Inc. and
Meyer v. Uber Technologies, Inc., came to opposite conclusions
regarding the validity of arbitration agreements despite the controversy stemming from the same app—Uber.4 In Cullinane, the
plaintiffs filed a class action against Uber, asserting that Uber imposed fictitious or inflated fees; Uber, in turn, filed a motion to
compel arbitration due to the arbitration agreement contained in
the app’s Terms and Conditions.5 The First Circuit analyzed the
validity of Uber’s arbitration agreement by evaluating whether
the terms of the agreement were reasonably communicated to
the plaintiffs.6 As a mobile contract, the court looked to whether
the terms were conspicuous within the design and context of the
interface.7 For these plaintiffs, Uber’s registration screen consisted of a black background with white and gray text, containing a total of twenty-six words.8 The First Circuit stated that
“[i]f everything on the screen is written in conspicuous features,
then nothing is conspicuous.” It held that Uber’s bold, white,
hyperlinked terms—including its arbitration agreement—were

Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 62–64 (1st Cir. 2018);
Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78.
3 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63–64; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79.
4 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63–64; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79.
5 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 55, 59.
6 Id. at 61–62.
7 Id. at 62.
8 Id. at 56–58, 62–63.
1
2
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not sufficiently conspicuous in terms of the context of the screen
to put users on inquiry notice of the terms.9
Similarly, in Meyer, the plaintiffs filed a class action alleging
that the app allowed drivers to fix prices.10 Again, Uber moved
to compel arbitration based on the app’s Terms of Service.11 The
Second Circuit also utilized a “reasonably conspicuous notice”
standard from the perspective of a reasonable smartphone user.12
Taking a seemingly more progressive view on the pervasiveness
and knowledge of mobile devices and users, the Second Circuit
held that in the context of the entire interface, there was “ample
evidence that a reasonable user would be on inquiry notice of the
terms.”13 In actuality, the screens in both Cullinane and Meyer
contain much the same language and design features;14 the discrepancy appears to turn on Uber’s branding and design during
the relevant time period.15
The standard for determining whether someone has been
provided notice of an arbitration agreement and whether they
have agreed to those terms should be more clearly defined to
better encompass the breadth of common knowledge of users of
different smartphones and other pervasive technology.16 A potential resolution would be to incorporate the understanding of a
reasonable person from the perspective of an app user.17 Such a
standard would account for the specialized common knowledge
held by the current paradigm of app users by tailoring the legal
standard to what is commonplace in this technological era, thus
ensuring its adaptability for future changes.18 Instead of the
traditional common law test of notice for determining the validity
of arbitration agreements, agreement to terms should turn on
whether there is reasonable access.19 If a modern app user has

Id. at 62–64.
Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2017).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 77–78.
13 Id. at 77, 79.
14 See infra Section II.E, Figure 1; Figure 2.
15 See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 62–64 (1st Cir. 2018);
Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79.
16 See infra Section II.F.
17 See infra Part III.
18 See id.
19 See infra Section III.B.
9

10
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reasonable access to the terms during and after registration, their
use of the app expresses an outward manifestation of assent to
the terms by nature of their knowledge and understanding of
what use of the app entails.20 Provided that an app user has
reasonable access to the terms, such user should be subject to
the terms in apps.21
I.ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND THEIR IMPORTANCE IN
CONSUMER CONTRACTS
A.The Federal Arbitration Act and Contract Law
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted by Congress
in 1925 in order to ensure validity and enforcement of arbitration
agreements subject to the Act, construed to be those agreements
that “affect[ ] interstate commerce in any way.”22 Section 2 of the
Act states that:
A written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal
to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising
out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.23

Given that arbitration agreements had historically been
treated with hostility in the law, the purpose of this section was
“to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other
contracts, where [they] belong.’”24 For that reason, the Act
preempts state law that would otherwise invalidate arbitration

See id.
See id.
22 JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30934, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2002); Michael L.
Ehren, Getting Your Day Outside of Court: A Guide to Compelling Arbitration
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, A.B.A. (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/
compelling_arbitration_under_faa/ [https://perma.cc/Y2R9-DFFZ].
23 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
24 Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991);
SHIMABUKURO, supra note 22, at 2 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1 (1924)).
20
21
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agreements.25 State law invalidation would “frustrate congressional intent” to maintain the Act’s even footing with contracts.26
Section 2 of the FAA also emphasizes “congressional declaration
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”27 The
extent of that favor has been interpreted such that as a matter
of federal law, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”28
Businesses are increasingly utilizing arbitration clauses
as part of their user agreements and user contracts “as a way to
quickly and quietly resolve disputes” in lieu of costly, burdensome
litigation.29 Part of the appeal to businesses is the sense of stability and predictability that arbitration agreements provide given
the FAA’s favor of arbitration and aversion to class action.30
By making arbitration agreements commensurate with contracts and favoring arbitration over litigation when interpreting
arbitration agreements, courts allow businesses to control the
amount of legal risk they take on.31 In arbitration agreements, use
of clear language that details how parties are obligated to act
mitigates risk associated with class action suits and the burdens
of time and expense associated with litigation.32 Arbitration

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1984).
Id. at 15–16; SHIMABUKURO, supra note 22, at 4.
27 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1983).
28 Id.
29 Jason Cheung, Business Use of Arbitration Clauses, LEGAL MATCH (May 2,
2018), https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/business-use-of-arbitra
tion-clauses.html [https://perma.cc/4SRK-QWQU].
30 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (“Requiring
the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”);
Tom Hagy, The Future of Mandatory Arbitration Shock: Sides Square Off in
Consumer Contracts and Employment Arenas, LexisNexis Corporate Law
Advisory (May 18, 2017), https://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/corporate
counselnewsletter/b/newsletter/archive/2017/05/18/the-future-of-mandatory-ar
bitration-shock-sides-square-off-in-consumer-contracts-and-employment-arenas
.aspx [https://perma.cc/QQ9Z-B8XD].
31 Robert Fojo, 12 Reasons Businesses Should Use Arbitration Agreements,
LEGAL IO (May 11, 2015), https://www.legal.io/guide/5550f4df77777765ebb80
100/12-Reasons-Businesses-Should-Use-Arbitration-Agreements [https://perma
.cc/88SK-4UK3].
32 Id.
25
26
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agreements accomplish this by providing companies with the
flexibility of choosing the details of dispute resolution.33 Companies can pick an arbitrator, keep matters private, and choose where
they arbitrate.34
The FAA sets out a “policy guaranteeing the enforcement
of private contractual arrangements,” thereby honoring arbitration
agreements.35 By enforcing such agreements in favor of arbitration, courts realize this policy of the FAA.36 Notwithstanding the
FAA’s favor of arbitration agreements, the determination of
whether a claim is arbitrable is still subject to (1) the existence
of a valid agreement to arbitrate, (2) the claim falling within the
scope of the arbitration agreement, and (3) the claim not being
precluded from arbitration by applicable law.37 Thus, a frequently
contested issue in consumer contracts is whether an agreement
has been made for courts to honor.38 Despite the proliferation of
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts,39 much litigation and
debate over these clauses stems from whether there was notice
of the terms such that a consumer has agreed to the clause.40
Per the FAA, there must be a valid agreement in order for
an arbitration agreement to be enforceable.41 Like in the context of
contracts, parties are not required to arbitrate unless they have

See Jean Murray, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Business Agreements, THE BALANCE SMALL BUSINESS (May 31, 2018), https://www.thebal
ancesmb.com/mandatory-arbitration-clauses-in-business-agreements-397425
[https://perma.cc/Q64L-3XQS]; Fojo, supra note 31.
34 Murray, supra note 33.
35 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985).
36 Id.
37 See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20–22 (2d Cir. 2002);
Ehren, supra note 22.
38 See generally Mandy Walker, The Arbitration Clause Hidden in Many
Consumer Contracts and the Consumer Rights You’re Giving Away as a Result,
CONSUMER REPORTS (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.consumerreports.org/cro
/shopping/the-arbitration-clause-hidden-in-many-consumer-contracts [https://
perma.cc/LL7Q-WTDE].
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 232–33 (2d Cir. 2016);
Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175–77 (9th Cir. 2014); C. Celeste
Creswell, Arbitration Clauses in Online Agreements, UBIQUITY (June 2000),
https://ubiquity.acm.org/article.cfm?id=339334 [https://perma.cc/4JD9-94MA].
41 Ehren, supra note 22.
33
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agreed to do so.42 This threshold question of whether there was an
agreement to arbitrate is determined by state contract law principles because arbitration is treated as “a matter of contract between the parties.”43 Therefore, as with any other contract, the
parties’ intentions control on this issue.44 Even so, parties’ intentions “are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability.”45
Accordingly, courts appear to construe arbitration clauses in consumer contracts in favor of arbitration lest the agreement emerged
from fraud or undue influence.46
As the scope of the FAA has been broadly construed to encompass congressional intent and federal policy favoring arbitration,47 courts generally resolve any doubts regarding scope in
favor of arbitration.48 Thus, the final determinant of arbitrability
(whether the arbitration agreement is precluded by applicable
law) only becomes relevant if a statute specifically precludes waiver
of judicial remedies by arbitration agreement.49 Otherwise, statutory claims are arbitrable.50
B.Business Use of Arbitration Agreements and Arbitration’s
Impact on Business
The use of arbitration agreements provides many benefits
to businesses, from saving time and expenses, to keeping any
potential claims brought against the company confidential.51 Given


Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2012).
Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 229 (citations omitted).
44 Gregory Klass, Interpretation and Construction in Contract Law, THE
SCHOLARLY COMMONS (Jan. 19, 2018) (draft at 1), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2913228 [https://perma.cc/RA9A-S2WF] (“When faced with questions of contract
interpretation, courts commonly begin with the principle that ‘[t]he primary
goal in interpreting contracts is to determine and enforce the parties’ intent.’”) (quoting Old Kent Bank v. Sobczak, 243 Mich. App. 57, 63 (2000)).
45 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985).
46 Id. at 627 (“[A]bsent such compelling considerations, the Act itself provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by
skewing the otherwise hospitable inquiry into arbitrability.”).
47 Id.; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22
(1983).
48 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25.
49 Ehren, supra note 22.
50 Id.
51 See Susan K. Leader & Jenna Nalchajian, INSIGHT: The Brightening
Spotlight on Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 24, 2018),
42
43
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the strong favor of arbitration by the FAA, businesses are better
able to predict and manage legal risk in an “effective and predictable fashion.”52 If a business does not include a mandatory
arbitration agreement into consumer contracts, it could substantially raise the cost of business by opening the door to the possibility of consumer class action litigation.53 In addition, arbitration
saves time by streamlining the legal requirements of litigation.54
For example, arbitration curtails otherwise broader rules for
discovery and simplifies the applicable rules of civil procedure
and evidence.55 A business can also select arbitrators that have
specialized knowledge or experience.56 Further, arbitrations are
confidential, as opposed to public court proceedings, and arbitration awards have little appeal rights and bases to vacate.57
The primary “strategic advantage” that businesses gain
by using arbitration clauses is in the decreased risk of class actions
that they may otherwise face.58 Class actions can be risky for businesses because of the possibility of substantial loss and heavy
expense for the company.59 Class actions create such a risk by
making otherwise worthless individual claims worthwhile through


https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/insight-the-brightening-spot
light-on-mandatory-arbitration-clauses [https://perma.cc/6EZ3-2FLZ]; Fojo,
supra note 31.
52 Fojo, supra note 31.
53 Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 467 (2010); Fojo,
supra note 31.
54 Fojo, supra note 31.
55 Id.; Jay N. Varon & Jennifer M. Keas, Shouldn’t You Be Using Arbitration Agreements to Reduce Costs of Litigation and Risk of Class Action Claims?,
NAT. L. REV. (May 10, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/shouldn-t
-you-be-using-arbitration-agreements-to-reduce-costs-litigation-and-risk [https://
perma.cc/CG39-UQJ3].
56 Varon & Keas, supra note 55.
57 Id.
58 Drahozal & Ware, supra note 53, at 467–68 (“[Arbitration clauses] prevent class actions and remit consumers to individual actions which, in light of the
stakes, are usually not worthwhile to pursue.”) (quoting Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer
and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 888 (2008)).
59 Gregory Brown, What Are Class Actions and How Do They Impact Businesses?, BROWN & CHARBONNEAU, LLP (July 25, 2017), https://www.bc-llp.com
/class-actions-impact-businesses/ [https://perma.cc/W2AU-SXKL].
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pooled resources and reduced expenses.60 By aggregating the
number of plaintiffs and the resources dedicated to litigation,
class action suits create “overwhelming settlement pressure.”61
This pressure stems from the high cost of defending large suits
and the possibility of having to pay out a large verdict.62 Settlement itself is often expensive due to paying out a large number
of class members.63
The FAA allows businesses to reduce the risk of class actions by allowing class action arbitration proceedings only where
the parties “express agreement is apparent from the contract.”64
The FAA does not allow class action arbitration where the agreement is “silent as to whether such proceedings are permissible.”65 By agreeing to terms containing a mandatory arbitration
agreement, a consumer must pursue individual arbitration instead
of class action claims.66 However, individual arbitration requires
a high investment of time and money and thus is pursued as
infrequently as solo litigation.67
II.DETERMINING AGREEMENT TO TERMS BY PROVIDING
NOTICE OF ARBITRATION
A.Arbitration Clauses Are Determined by State Contract Law
The threshold question of whether an arbitration clause is
valid is determined by state-specific contract law.68 Many states’
contract laws are similar regarding whether parties have agreed
to contract terms.69 However, other differences in state contract


60 Drahozal & Ware, supra note 53, at 467–68 (“[F]ew consumers will seek redress on an individual basis due to lack of information or the small amounts
in dispute.”).
61 Id. at 468.
62 Brown, supra note 59.
63 Drahozal & Ware, supra note 53, at 468; Brown, supra note 59.
64 Richard Glucksman, Arbitration Law as We Move Into 2017, AMWINS
GROUP, INC. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.amwins.com/docs/default-source/In
sights/clientadvisory_arbitration-laws-1-1797c68c070c5e6535a197ff0000da17
6d.pdf?sfvrsn=6198e95f_2 [https://perma.cc/T9KB-36E5].
65 Id.
66 Brown, supra note 59.
67 Id.
68 Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2017).
69 See Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating
in reference to which states’ law applied to the case, “neither that court nor



2020]

APP USER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

541

law could be a factor for businesses to weigh in consideration of
choice of law for their contracts.70 In most states, the proper inquiry
is whether the parties have shown an outward manifestation of
assent to a contract and its terms.71 The Restatement (Second)
of Contracts defines conduct expressing manifestation of assent
as “words or silence, action or inaction” so long as the party “intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know
that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.”72
Mutual assent is based on an objective standard “applied to the
outward manifestations or expressions of the parties.”73
Online- or application-based businesses have created new
scenarios for courts to interpret contract law.74 However, they
have not changed the way that contract principles are applied to
them.75 As discussed below, assent to online contracts can be
determined through applying traditional contract principles to
new methods of assent, such as clickwrap or browsewrap agreements.76 Nonetheless, all iterations of contracts require the same
display of intent to engage in the contracted conduct such that
others could infer assent.77

this one need resolve this typically thorny choice-of-law question, because
both Connecticut and California apply substantially similar rules for determining whether the parties have mutually assented to a contract term”).
70 See D.C. Toedt, Choice-of-Law Cheat Sheet for Contract Negotiators, ON
CONTRACTS (July 9, 2009), https://www.oncontracts.com/cheat-sheets/choice-of
-law-crib-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/K5BK-XH6T].
71 See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61–62 (1st Cir. 2018);
Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74; Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir.
2016); Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 119–20.
72 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19(2) (1965); see Schnabel, 697 F.3d
at 120.
73 Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 119 (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. AMZ Ins.
Servs., Inc., 188 Cal. App. 4th 401, 422 (2010)).
74 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75.
75 Id.
76 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 232–33 (“Clickwraps force users to ‘expressly and
unambiguously manifest either assent or rejection prior to being given access
to the product.’”) (quoting Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429
(2d Cir. 2004)).
77 Id. at 232 (stating that manifestation of assent for online contracts “can
be accomplished by ‘words or silence, action or inaction,’ so long as the user
‘intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the
other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.’”) (quoting Schnabel,
697 F.3d at 120).
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Further, regardless of an offeree’s outward manifestations
of assent, in most states the offeree is not bound “by inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he is unaware, contained in
a document whose contractual nature is not obvious.”78 This
requires that the terms of the agreement be reasonably communicated to the person accepting the agreement.79 Nonetheless, if
an offeree has no actual notice of an arbitration agreement, he or
she would still be bound by a provision if the offeree is on “inquiry
notice of the term and assents to it through the conduct that a
reasonable person would understand to constitute assent.”80 For
example, the state of Washington provides two circumstances that
put an offeree on inquiry notice: (1) when the offeree has reason
to know that a term exists from all facts and circumstances
known to him at the time, or (2) if the offeree has received notification of the information from someone who took steps that would
have been reasonably required to inform the offeree.81
Given this interpretation, courts tend to apply a two-step
inquiry to determine (1) whether the terms of the agreement were
reasonably communicated (i.e., reasonably conspicuous notice), and
(2) whether there was agreement to those terms as evidenced by
an outward manifestation of assent.82
California and Massachusetts, the states at issue in Cullinane and Meyer, are examples of utilizing the same standard
for determining the existence of an agreement to terms of the
same app based on each states’ individual contract laws.83 Both
states, when approaching Uber’s terms of agreement, asked
whether there was sufficient notice of the arbitration clause based
on the clarity and conspicuousness of the terms presented, followed by whether there was assent to those terms.84 Regardless of
a showing or manifestation of assent, offerees in both jurisdictions
are not bound by contractual terms that are inconspicuous.85


78 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74 (quoting Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306
F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2002)).
79 Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 2018).
80 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233 (quoting Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 120).
81 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.1-202(a)(3), (d); Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233.
82 See, e.g., Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62; Meyer, 868 F.3d 77–80; Nicosia, 834
F.3d at 236–37.
83 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 61–62; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74–75.
84 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 61–62; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74–75.
85 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 61; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74–75 (discussing the validity of web-based and electronic contracts) (“There is nothing automatically
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Thus, the crux of the issue presented by the differing outcomes of
Cullinane and Meyer is based on the level of conspicuousness of the
terms presented to each set of app users, despite the two states
applying the same legal standard to the same smartphone app.86
B.Online Agreements—Clickwrap, Browsewrap & Continuously
Evolving Methods of Agreement
Despite technology continually changing and advancing,
presenting the courts with new situations, courts continue to rely
on the same principles of notice and assent from contract law in
determining the validity of arbitration agreements in online- and
application-based terms of conditions or user contracts.87 While
the same primary legal principles apply, the ever-changing
means of conveying terms require different analyses to determine whether notice and assent are met.88 Courts regularly uphold clickwrap agreements because the user must affirmatively
assent to the terms of agreement by clicking “I agree”; if the user
does not agree, they will be disabled from accessing or utilizing
the site or application.89 Courts have found that such an electronic “‘click can suffice to signify the acceptance of a contract’”
provided that the user has reasonable notice.90
Alternatively, browsewrap agreements do not require an
express assent to the terms by an affirmative action.91 A user of
a website or application agrees to the terms of the site itself by
merely visiting the site.92 In the browsewrap context, the terms

offensive about such agreements, as long as the layout and language of the
site give the user reasonable notice that a click will manifest assent to an
agreement.”) (quoting Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1033–34
(7th Cir. 2016)).
86 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–64; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78.
87 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–63; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75.
88 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–63; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75–76; Nicosia v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 232–34 (2d Cir. 2016); Nguyen v. Barnes &
Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175–77 (9th Cir. 2014).
89 See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75; Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233 (“Clickwraps force
users to ‘expressly and unambiguously manifest either assent or rejection prior
to being given access to the product.’” (quoting Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,
356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004))).
90 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75 (quoting Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1033–34).
91 Id. at 75; Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176.
92 Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176.
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are available via hyperlink somewhere on the website, but a user
does not have to view or click to accept the terms before using the
site.93 These too are regularly enforced by courts so long as the
user had actual notice of the agreement.94 However, when there is
no actual notice, the validity of browsewrap and other web-based
agreements can be established if the website or application “puts
a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the
contract.”95 Inquiry notice for arbitration agreements in webbased contracts “turns on the ‘[c]larity and conspicuousness of
the arbitration terms’” which are a “function of the design and
content of the relevant interface.”96 Thus, the validity of browsewrap agreements depends on knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the terms and conditions based predominantly on
the conspicuousness of the terms on the user interface.97
Because new technology and user platforms are constantly
being created, updated, and redesigned, there are a myriad of ways
to design online and mobile electronic user contracts which do
not neatly fit into either the clickwrap or browsewrap categories.98 For this reason, courts have generally found terms of
agreement valid on various interfaces if the existence of the terms
were reasonably communicated to the user.99 Yet, as user understanding is advancing in step with technology,100 the courts’
interpretations as to what is reasonably communicated appears
to be lagging behind.101

See id.
Id. (“[C]ourts have consistently enforced browsewrap agreements where
the user had actual notice of the agreement.”).
95 Id. at 1177; see Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74–75.
96 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75.
97 See id.; Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016).
98 See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75.
99 See id.; Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233.
100 See Michael H. Payne, Technology Learning Curve Requires Patience, but
It’s Worth It (Jan. 21, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/technology-learn
ing-curve-requires-patience-012127183.html [https://perma.cc/P8KZ-BYNH];
John Smith, 7 Technologies We Can Expect to Be Commonplace Soon (Feb. 3,
2016), https://www.business2community.com/tech-gadgets/7-technologies-can
-expect-commonplace-soon-01445748 [https://perma.cc/XCQ9-TKVA].
101 Compare Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 839 F.3d 53, 63–64 (1st Cir.
2018), with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78.
93
94
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C.Determining Reasonably Conspicuous Notice
Whether a web-based user has inquiry notice of the terms
of an agreement depends on the clarity and conspicuousness of
the terms.102 An agreement’s clarity and conspicuousness is determined by looking to “the design and content of the relevant
interface.”103 This includes whether there is clutter on the screen,
the user has to scroll to see the terms, there is a lack of contrasting colors or fonts that stand out from the rest of the screen,
or the terms are linked in “obscure sections of a webpage that
users are unlikely to see.”104 Some examples of characteristics
that make terms more conspicuous are larger and contrasting
fonts, capital letter headings, or otherwise setting the terms off
from surrounding text by use of symbols or other marks.105 In
addition, terms can be considered more conspicuous if they are
spatially oriented near “the mechanism for manifesting assent”
and if the terms are temporally coupled with the manifestation
of agreement, by noting acceptance to terms as a consumer is
registering for or purchasing from a website or app.106 The level
of conspicuousness of terms is subject to a reasonable person
standard.107 Such a malleable and subjective standard opens the
door to varying interpretations of the conspicuousness of terms
in the realm of apps.108
D.A Reasonable Person Standard’s Correlation to Reasonably
Conspicuous Notice
A reasonable person standard is used to judge the conspicuousness of the terms to determine whether a website or app
user had notice of electronic terms of agreement.109 The reasonable


102 See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74–75; Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306
F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2002).
103 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75; see Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d
1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014).
104 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233; see Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78.
105 See Cullinane, 839 F.3d at 62.
106 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78; see Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110,
127 (2d Cir. 2012).
107 See Cullinane, 839 F.3d at 62; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77; Nicosia, 834 F.3d
at 233.
108 Compare Cullinane, 839 F.3d at 62–63, with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78.
109 See Cullinane, 839 F.3d at 62; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77; Nicosia, 834 F.3d
at 233.
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person standard is utilized to “define the legal duty to protect
one’s own interest and that of others.”110 In effect, it “requires
one to act with the same degree of care, knowledge, experience,
fair-mindedness, and awareness of the law that the community
would expect of a hypothetical reasonable person.”111
Thus, in determining the conspicuousness of terms for apps,
the Second Circuit has considered reasonableness through the “perspective of a reasonably prudent smartphone user.”112 In Meyer,
the Second Circuit held that a reasonably prudent smartphone user
would have knowledge of and would have encountered an app
and could be presumed to have entered into a contract using a
smartphone.113 In addition, both the First and Second Circuits
recognized that a reasonably prudent user would know that a hyperlink would take them to another webpage containing additional information and that hyperlinks are typically identified by
blue, underlined text.114 Moreover, utilizing hyperlinks to provide
access to Terms of Service has been upheld as providing reasonable
notice, as clicking on a hyperlink has been dubbed “the twentyfirst century equivalent of turning over the cruise ticket ... [—]the
consumer is prompted to examine terms of sale that are located
somewhere else.”115 Nonetheless, whether terms are valid based on
their reasonable conspicuousness is a fact-intensive inquiry which
must be contextualized.116 Courts utilize similar factors in making
the determination of whether a reasonable user would have inquiry notice of an electronic contract’s terms.117 However, such
static factors as applied to specific, variable facts in cases of different apps may yield different results as technology and user

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS ETHICS AND SOCIETY 1772 (Robert Kolb ed.,
Sage Publ’ns 1st ed. 2008).
111 Id.
112 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77.
113 See id.
114 See Cullinane, 839 F.3d at 63; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78.
115 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78 (quoting Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d
829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
116 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63 (holding that the objective conspicuousness of
terms must be put in context with the rest of the display and process, and not
just “read in a vacuum”); see Meyer, 868 F.3d at 76.
117 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–63; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78; Nicosia v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233, 236 (2d Cir. 2015).
110
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interfaces continue to change. This scenario is exemplified by the
diverging results in the First and Second Circuit opinions.118
E.Meyer v. Uber and Cullinane v. Uber: Different Interpretations
of Contract Principles in the App Context
Despite molding well-established principles of contract
law to evaluate new forms of electronic contracts, when they are
applied to app-based technology, the outcomes can vary as in
Meyer and Cullinane.119 As both courts decided the issue on inquiry notice, the basic question in both cases was essentially the
same—was there reasonably conspicuous notice provided to the
user in light of the user interface?120 In Meyer, the Second Circuit looked to the interface of the Uber app from the perspective
of a reasonable smartphone user to determine the conspicuousness of the terms.121 In doing so, the court explicitly noted the
pervasiveness of smartphone and application use.122 Again, the
Second Circuit accepted that such a reasonable person would
understand that blue underlined text constitutes a hyperlink,
which opens another webpage containing additional information
and noted some familiarity with mobile contracts.123 The First
Circuit in Cullinane used a similar “reasonable user” standard to
answer the same question of assent to terms based on their conspicuousness in relation to the user interface.124 Compared to
the Second Circuit, the First Circuit in Cullinane appears to take a
less progressive view of mobile technology and user understanding.125 The First Circuit also recognized common understanding
of a traditional hyperlink, and while it appears open to recognizing
non-traditional characteristics of hyperlinks,126 it gave significant weight to the fact that the hyperlink was not presented in a

Compare Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63, with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79.
Compare Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63, with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79.
120 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78.
121 See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 76–77.
122 See id. at 77.
123 See id. at 77–78.
124 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63.
125 Compare id. at 62, with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79.
126 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63 (“While not all hyperlinks need to have the same
characteristics, they are ‘commonly blue and underlined.’” (citation omitted)).
118
119
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traditional manner.127 The presentation of the hyperlink in a
gray rectangular box raised concern as to whether a “reasonable
user” would have understood that to constitute a hyperlink.128
In analyzing the context of the hyperlinked terms in relation to the rest of the surrounding screen, the First Circuit in
Cullinane also gave weight to the fact that the screen contained
other, more conspicuous information, text, and buttons, which
took away from the conspicuousness of the hyperlinked terms.129
The court appeared to hone in on the conspicuousness and appearance of the actual hyperlink as compared to the surrounding
text on the screen, despite conceding that other features of the
screen would weigh in favor of Uber.130 While the court determined that the “white bold font” of the hyperlink could have
been considered conspicuous on its own, or within a more plain
and limited screen, it held that in the context of other conspicuous features and text on the screen, the hyperlinked terms became inconspicuous.131 In other words, the court held that “[i]f
everything on the screen is written with conspicuous features,
then nothing is conspicuous.”132
In contrast, when considering the overall context of the
screen, the Second Circuit appeared to focus less on the hyperlink itself, and more so on the interface as a whole.133 The court
weighed in favor of conspicuousness partly due to the language
located near the button that signaled manifestation of assent.134
The Second Circuit reasoned that the language, “[b]y creating an
Uber account, you agree ... ” clearly signaled to users that they
would be subject to Uber’s terms of agreement.135 In determining sufficient notice and assent to the terms, the court coupled

See id.
See id.
129 See id. at 63–64.
130 Id. at 63 (“[T]he language and the number of words found on the ‘Link
Card’ and ‘Link Payment’ screens could be seen to favor Uber’s position.”).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 64 (“Even though the hyperlink did possess some of the characteristics that make a term conspicuous, the presence of other terms on the same
screen with a similar or larger size, typeface, and with more noticeable attributes diminished the hyperlink’s capability to grab the user’s attention.”).
133 See Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2017).
134 See id. at 78–79.
135 Id. at 78.
127
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the spatial proximity of this language with the fact that the
screen was uncluttered and entirely visible at once, and that the
hyperlink itself contrasted with the background of the screen.136
While applying the same standard and utilizing similar
factors in their determination, the Circuits came to opposite conclusions about whether the users of the same application were
put on reasonable notice to the terms of agreement when registering for the app.137
The holdings in Meyer and Cullinane are so contradictory
because the app at issue and the legal standard applied are the
same—the Uber app and the reasonable person standard for
notice.138 The differing outcomes appear to turn on Uber’s marketing and design choices in the relevant time periods.139 While
the decisions were rendered only a year apart, the interface in
which the Terms of Service were located and the appearance of
the registration process were very different given the timing of
when the plaintiffs registered for Uber.140
In Meyer, the plaintiff registered for Uber in 2014.141 In
2014, the final registration screen was white, with minimal,
uncluttered text and fillable data forms to insert the user’s payment method, as reflected in Figure 1.142 Underneath the “Register” button in smaller text was the language, “[b]y creating an Uber
account, you agree to the TERMS OF SERVICE & PRIVACY
POLICY.”143 This “TERMS OF SERVICE & PRIVACY POLICY”

Id.
Caleb J. Schillinger, First Circuit Invalidates Arbitration Clause in
Mobile App User Agreement, SEYFARTH SHAW (July 5, 2018), https://www.con
sumerclassdefense.com/2018/07/first-circuit-invalidates-arbitration-clause-in-mo
bil-app-user-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/FY7F-DWPS].
138 See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 839 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2018); Meyer,
868 F.3d at 79.
139 Compare Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 58, 63, with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79.
See generally Nathan McAlone, This Is How Uber Used to Look When It First
Started Out—and How It’s Changed Over Time, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2016,
4:54 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ubers-design-history-2010-2016
-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/AD6J-UPFM] (presenting a visual timeline of Uber’s
evolving branding strategy from 2010 to 2016).
140 Compare Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 56–58, with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 70–71.
141 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 70.
142 Id. at 78; see Figure 1.
143 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78.
136
137
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text was a blue, underlined hyperlink.144 Despite the small size
of the text alerting the user to Uber’s terms, the court held that
the darker font and clearly hyperlinked Terms of Service against
the backdrop of a plain, white screen that was entirely visible at one
time were sufficient to make the terms conspicuous and therefore provide notice to Uber’s terms.145


144
145

Id.
Id.
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FIGURE 1. SCREENSHOTS OF REGISTRATION PROCESS IN MEYER146
In contrast, the plaintiffs in Cullinane registered for Uber between the years 2012 and 2014 and experienced a very different

Id. at 81–82. Screenshots in Figure 1 resemble the “actual-size screenshot of the last step in the registration process, as it would have appeared on
Meyer’s Samsung Galaxy S5.” Id. at 78 n.9. While the sizing of the screenshots
in this Note are not exact, they are copies of the actual-sized screenshots
utilized by and appended to the court’s opinion.
146

552 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:531
user interface, as reflected in Figure 2.147 While there existed two
different screen options for payment that could be utilized by plaintiffs at this time (“Link Payment” and “Link Card” screens), both
screens were stylistically the same for purposes of judicial analysis. During this period, the registration screen had a black
background with a white text box to type in payment information and light gray instructional text.148 Below the fillable
field for payment was dark gray text that read, “[b]y creating an
Uber account, you agree to the,” and below that read “Terms of
Service & Privacy Policy” in bold white text in a gray rectangular box—a clickable hyperlink that would take users to Uber’s
terms and privacy policy.149 The court emphasized that the gray
box containing Uber’s terms did not have the traditional characteristics of a hyperlink.150 Taking this fact into account, in addition to the rest of the bolded and distinctive text on the screen
presented at the same time, the court held that the text alerting
users to the terms was no longer conspicuous and did not provide reasonable notice to the user.151


Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 55, 57–58 (1st Cir. 2018).
Compare Figure 1, with Figure 2.
148 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 57–58.
149 Id. at 57–59.
150 Id. at 63.
151 Id. at 63–64.
147
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FIGURE 2. SCREENSHOTS OF REGISTRATION
PROCESS IN CULLINANE152


Thus, it appears the Circuits divided due to design differences in Uber’s user interface and app design, which, according

Id. at 56–58. The screenshots in Figure 2 resemble and “accurately depict
the content of the Uber App screens presented to the Plaintiffs.” Id. at 56 n.3.
While the sizing of the screenshots in this Note are not exact, they are copies of
the actual-sized screenshots utilized by and appended to the court’s opinion.
152
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to the First Circuit, did not conform to a traditional concept of
web contracts.153 This could create an ongoing issue for Uber,
and many other companies, as design changes and rebranding
occur frequently.154 Moreover, when the color is stripped away,
the similarities among the two interfaces are readily apparent.155
The court in Cullinane noted that Uber’s “Link Payment” and
“Link Card” screens had a mere twenty-six words and that the
language, “Terms of Service & Privacy Policy,” would tend to favor
conspicuousness if not for other features.156 However, the screen
in Meyer contained approximately twenty-eight words and contained the same language to signal the user to the terms, yet the
court held that in that context, they were conspicuous.157 Thus,
despite using similar features and language, as user interfaces
for apps modernize, the courts may begin to lag behind in what
a “reasonably prudent user” could be presumed to know, and
continue to come to differing conclusions regarding notice, even
when utilizing the same standard.158
F.Current Mobile App Use and Modern Understanding of
Technology
On its face, using a reasonable smartphone user to determine whether an individual is put on inquiry notice of the
terms of an app appears to be an appropriate objective indicator
for notice.159 However, as technology rapidly changes, especially
in mobile apps, and as the proliferation of app use continues,160

See id. at 62–64.
See, e.g., McAlone, supra note 139.
155 Compare Figure 1, with Figure 2.
156 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–63.
157 Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2017); Figure 1.
158 See, e.g., Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75, 77–78 (discussing the rapid adoption of
mobile technology, its evolving applications, and pervasiveness).
159 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–63; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75, 77–78.
160 See Celine Ledbury et al., Something for Everyone: Why the Growth of
Mobile Apps Is Good News for Brands, IPSOS MORI 1, 8 (July 2017), https://
www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/2017-08/Google-mobile-apps-report-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LV5T-9NNG]; Joe Parker, 10 Years of Growth of Mobile App
Market, KNOWBAND, https://www.knowband.com/blog/mobile-app/growth-of-mo
bile-app-market/ [https://perma.cc/MN7H-LRKM]; Mobile App Trends That
Will Dominate 2019, EFUTURES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.efuturesworld.com
/mobile-app-trends-that-will-dominate-2019/ [https://perma.cc/W2YF-NLUV].
153
154
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common knowledge of users may be changing faster than the
courts can apply a standard that adequately captures whether a
reasonable user would have notice of terms.161
In 2017, the number of smartphone users in the United
States reached 246.6 million and is projected to reach 285.3 million by 2023.162 Of smartphone users between the ages of 18 and
64, over 90 percent use apps.163 The average smartphone user
has between 60 and 90 apps downloaded to their phone, spending an average of 2 hours and 15 minutes per day using at least
9 apps per day.164 In 2016, overall app usage increased by 11
percent and the amount of time that people spent using apps grew
by 69 percent.165 As apps become even more pervasive and are
created for use in nearly every aspect of people’s lives, the market for them is expected to double to nearly $290 billion by 2024.
People’s phones have become flooded with apps.166 Not only are
app users gaining a more specialized knowledge in functionality

See, e.g., Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75, 77–78.
Number of Smartphone Users in the United States from 2010 to 2023 (in
millions)*, STATISTA (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/201182
/forecast-of-smartphone-users-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/9ENT-A3PP].
163 Ledbury et al., supra note 160, at 8.
164 Ben Lovejoy, The Average Smartphone User Spends 2h 15m a Day Using
Apps—How About You?, 9 TO 5 MAC (May 5, 2017, 7:17 AM), https://9to5mac
.com/2017/05/05/average-app-user-per-day/ [https://perma.cc/5C87-E92M]; Sarah
Perez, Report: Smartphone Owners are Using 9 Apps Per Day, 30 Per Month, TECH
CRUNCH (May 4, 2017, 1:16 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/04/report
-smartphone-owners-are-using-9-apps-per-day-30-per-month/ [https://perma
.cc/6NYP-TM8F].
165 Simon Khalaf, On Their Tenth Anniversary, Mobile Apps Start Eating
Their Own, FLURRY ANALYTICS BLOG (Jan. 12, 2017), https://flurrymobile
.tumblr.com/post/155761509355/on-their-tenth-anniversary-mobile-apps-start
[https://perma.cc/B68Q-E38U].
166 Neil Petch, There’s an App for That: Seven Apps Entrepreneurs Should
Make Use Of, ENTREPRENEUR MIDDLE EAST (Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.entrepre
neur.com/article/291928 [https://perma.cc/3HXU-E2A4]; see Bobby Emamian,
To Make Your App Stand Out in a Saturated Market, Offer Users What They
Really Want, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/theyec/2015/04/09/to-make-your-app-stand-out-in-a-saturated-market-offer-users
-what-they-really-want/#6d8f6d877aba [https://perma.cc/A9WS-XGCQ] (“On the
smartphone Monopoly board, app real estate used to be like Baltic Avenue.
But with the massive number of available apps and the finite amount of storage
space on smartphones, it’s now more like Park Place and is quickly approaching Boardwalk status.”).
161
162
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and use of apps, but app developers are trying to keep up with
competition through the advancement of superior interfaces,
which in turn improve app usability and experience.167
As everyday technology, smartphone technology, and apps
evolve, app users are developing an expanded common knowledge
base of how apps typically work and what their use entails.168
Users’ common knowledge is evident by the fact that users have
become familiar with certain screens, such as “Getting Started”
screens and other design features recognized even by the court
in Cullinane.169 It is further supported by the fact that “[p]redictability is a fundamental principle of [user interface] design,”
indicating that regardless of the app, users learn and adapt to
interfaces across application type.170 App users understand far
more than “blue plus underline equals hyperlink”; they are currently gaining a common knowledge of gestures—“the new
clicks.”171 Far beyond the blue text hyperlinks of past websites,
multi-touch technology, through which users can tap, pinch, spread,
and swipe, has become mainstream since Apple introduced it with
the iPhone.172 Users have quickly adapted to this technology and
prefer to use it.173
By recognizing this common knowledge among users and
by taking into account user preferences, companies that utilize apps
are strategizing their entry, prevalence, or permanence in the
market through streamlining and enhancing user experience.174

See Nick Babich, A Comprehensive Guide to Mobile App Design,
SMASHING MAGAZINE (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.smashingmagazine.com/20
18/02/comprehensive-guide-to-mobile-app-design/ [https://perma.cc/J3WA-479P];
Emamian, supra note 166.
168 See Babich, supra note 167 (stating that app users are familiar with certain screens that have “become de facto standards for mobile apps” which “don’t
require additional explanation because users are already familiar with them”).
169 See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2018)
(“[W]ithin the gray bar, [is] an illustration of three circles connected by a green
line. These circles indicated the user’s progress through Uber’s registration
process.”); Babich, supra note 167.
170 Babich, supra note 167.
171 Nick Babich, In-App Gestures and Mobile App User Experience, SMASHING
MAGAZINE (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.smashingmagazine.com/2016/10/in-app
-gestures-and-mobile-app-user-experience/ [https://perma.cc/Y5AM-5D5S].
172 Id.
173 See id.
174 See Babich, supra note 167; Emamian, supra note 166.
167
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Streamlining and simplification includes minimizing cognitive
load by decluttering, reducing user effort, and minimizing user
data input.175 Enhancing user experience consists of anticipating
user needs and putting the user in control by keeping the app
interactive, familiar, and predictable.176 Visual design across the
board is an important feature in order to create an accessible
and navigable interface using bold, contrasting colors and visual
cues, animations, and gestures.177 A key aspect and common
theme of a good user interface across developers and designers is
having a simple and familiar design.178
For businesses utilizing arbitration agreements, this means
that through enhanced design and use of gestures, companies
have the ability to declutter their app to “leav[e] more space for
valuable content” and “make[ ] the app content-focused.”179 Still,
in moving away from traditional design and in an attempt to
integrate branding, businesses have the common design question
of how to emphasize a particular section in an app.180 Companies
like Intuit feel as if “call[s] to action” are a good opportunity to
“incorporate brand elements, such as [their] ecosystem green color
or line iconography.”181 By integrating their brand into their design, Intuit has “deliberately moved away from using text as calls
to action, and instead use buttons with high contrast.”182 Integrating a brand into a company’s mobile app experience is a vital
strategic move because brand identification has become “the

Babich, supra note 167.
Id.
177 Id.
178 See 11 App Features, Trends & Innovations in Mobile Development,
MOBIDEV (Apr. 1, 2018), https://mobidev.biz/blog/11_key_features_of_a_suc
cessful_mobile_app [https://perma.cc/2F9C-NJLE]; Babich, supra note 167;
Emamian, supra note 166; Harnil Oza, Importance of UI/UX Design in the
Development of Mobile Apps, HYPERLINK INFOSYSTEM (Oct. 17, 2017), https://
www.hyperlinkinfosystem.com/blog/importance-of-uiux-design-in-the-develop
ment-of-mobile-apps [https://perma.cc/6HH2-37N2].
179 Babich, supra note 171.
180 See Yvonne So, Designing for Mobile Apps: Overall Principles, Common
Patterns, and Interface Guidelines, MEDIUM (May 12, 2017), https://medium
.com/blueprint-by-intuit/native-mobile-app-design-overall-principles-and-com
mon-patterns-26edee8ced10 [https://perma.cc/GK5W-BTYL].
181 Id.
182 Id.
175
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cornerstone of the customer relationship” due to the fact that “customers live on mobile first.”183 This methodology is not ill-founded;
a York University case study found that “custom mobile safety apps
received ... 50–100x more downloads than generic apps,” evidencing users’ preference for branded apps over generic apps.184
Thus, based on app prevalence and the modern user’s understanding and experience with them, businesses have been
leveraging the design of their user interface to compete in the
app market and strengthen their branding.185 However, given
the current environment after the First and Second Circuit decisions in Cullinane and Meyer,186 businesses may need to forego
some aspects of user experience in order to be more conscientious
of a legal standard that is not keeping pace with app users.187
III.REDEFINING VALIDITY OF TERMS FOR APP USERS
Determining the validity of terms by notice and acceptance
in apps should be updated to reflect the current knowledge and
skill of app users.188 The current legal standard for determining
the validity of mobile contract terms is assessed by means of having
notice via reasonably conspicuous terms.189 Given that app use
is so prevalent and carries with it a common understanding of
app use, inquiry notice based on the conspicuousness of terms
through the lens of a reasonable user should take into account
the heightened knowledge and skill of the average app user.190


Tobias Dengel, Four Ways to Rethink the Brand App Experience, FORBES
(June 11, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/06/11/four
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186 See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2018); Meyer
v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2017).
187 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63.
188 See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77.
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Such a standard would reflect the fact that app users have a
heightened base knowledge and skill from their experience using
apps.191 Further, it would account for the reality that fewer than
10 percent of individuals consent to legal terms after actually
reading them.192 While a redefined standard encompassing these
realities may anticipate some shortfalls, there are many ways to
mitigate these downsides while still allowing businesses to adapt
with advancing technology.193
A.Understanding the Scope of Who Reads Terms
While contract law typically will not bind a party to an inconspicuous term,194 the unfortunate reality for technology users
is that these users rarely actually read terms of service, whether
or not they are faced with having to agree in the affirmative.195
Nonetheless, the current standard places heavy emphasis on
whether the terms, or access to the terms, are conspicuous.196
A Deloitte study of consumers found that 91 percent of
people “consent to legal terms and services conditions without
reading them,” a statistic which rises to 97 percent for those in

See Babich, supra note 167 (stating that app users are familiar with
certain screens that are common across applications and prefer predictability
in apps); Babich, supra note 171 (noting user familiarity of common gestures
such as tap, double tap, drag, pinch, and spread); Gabriel Shaoolian, Key
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.cc/3PSW-KJZ9] (stating that users understand and use navigational functions intuitively).
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[https://perma.cc/FDQ8-8BAA].
194 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63–64; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74.
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On the Internet and It Made Me Want to Die, THE GUARDIAN (June 15, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/15/i-read-all-the-small-print
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the age range of 18 to 34—the heaviest app users.197 A York
University study, through which student subjects were confronted
with agreeing to privacy and service agreements of NameDrop, a
fictitious network app, confirmed this statistic.198 NameDrop’s
terms required the subject users to “give NameDrop their future
first-born children.”199 In that study, only roughly a quarter of
students “even bothered to look at the fine print,” and even so, all
of the students agreed to the terms, which makes user’s affirmance of acceptance to terms “the biggest lie on the internet.”200
Further, whether or not users are actually confronted
with the terms to which they must agree raises two additional
issues that are not likely to be solved by the reasonably conspicuous standard: (1) the terms are extremely lengthy and often written in legal jargon, and (2) users would not have the bargaining
power to negotiate their terms of use anyway.201 Taking the time
to read an “average American’s digital contracts” would exhaust
almost 250 hours per year, with most individuals being confronted with a single 21,586-word user agreement just for their
Apple smartphone and any Apple apps.202 The terms are typically
difficult to read, not only in terms of legibility and clarity, but also
in substance.203 This is in part due to the legal requirements of
conspicuousness and partly because of the attempt to encompass
a myriad of legal situations in one text.204 Apart from how illegible terms can be, mustering through reading them will not give

Cakebread, supra note 192; Number of Mobile App Hours Per Smartphone
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(Sept. 2016), https://www.statista.com/statistics/323522/us-user-mobile-app
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198 David Berreby, Click to Agree to What? No One Reads Terms of Service,
Studies Confirm, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2017/mar/03/terms-of-service-online-contracts-fine-print [https://
perma.cc/MF7X-SHQP].
199 Id.
200 Id. (stating that even those who read only skimmed: “on average, these
more careful joiners spent around a minute with the thousands of words that
make up NameDrop’s privacy and service agreements”).
201 Id.; Hern, supra note 195.
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a user any extra bargaining power.205 For example, even if a
reader of terms does disagree with a clause, the only solution is
to not use it; reading the terms does not give you an opportunity
to negotiate out of a particular term.206 Nonetheless, even if users
become aware of a term that they dislike, it is unlikely that they
will stop using an application that they are loyal to.207
B.Redefining a Reasonable Person Standard for App Users
A modern standard would be to incorporate a heightened
technological understanding into a “reasonable app user” standard and allow reasonable access to the terms to suffice for inquiry notice. App users should constitute a special group among
all individuals such that they are held to a heightened standard
of knowledge and skill, like professionals and tradespeople.208
Accordingly, by engaging in app activity, including registering
and entering into app contracts, all app users should be held to
the same level of responsibility, regardless of experience level, just
as newly licensed drivers are held to the same standard as experienced drivers.209 Modern app users understand what various
types of hyperlinks look like, and they understand what the various
screens mean when they are first downloading or registering an
app as well as when they are using it. Additionally, modern app
users understand what the language “Terms and Conditions”
means and what constitutes entering into such contracts.210 Holding app users to this standard compels the user to understand
the implications of using an app, and the fact that they are being subjected to contractual provisions in terms and conditions
agreements.211 This incorporates a common understanding of the

Id.
Id. (“If you hit ‘disagree’ while setting up an iPhone ... it doesn’t call up an
Apple lawyer and offer you the opportunity to renegotiate the terms ... [i]nstead, it
simply bounces you back to the page before, and waits for you to try again.”).
207 Id.
208 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS ETHICS AND SOCIETY 1772 (Robert Kolb
ed., Sage Publ’ns 1st ed. 2008).
209 See id.
210 See Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 77 (2d Cir. 2017); Babich,
supra note 167; Babich, supra note 171.
211 See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable
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current paradigm of app users into the legal standard, in a similar manner to how general contractual principles interpret a
contract to have the meaning that a reasonable person would
give it “if he knew everything he should plus everything he actually knew.”212
This modern, redefined standard may have been one that
both the First and Second Circuits attempted to apply in Cullinane
and Meyer,213 but without fully understanding the extent of an
average app user’s knowledge. This may be partly due to the fact
that judges add a layer of subjectivity on to the objective standard of a reasonable person.214 Consequently, a redefined standard should incorporate this knowledge such that reasonable
access to the terms suffices for a user having inquiry notice of
the terms.215 Reasonable access affords app users the opportunity
to review terms before use, if they so choose, but will not impede
businesses from designing and branding their app in a progressive way.216 So long as a user has the ability to reasonably access the terms before they register or use an app, and so long as
the terms are not hidden or absent in any way, the user will be
put on inquiry notice of these terms.217 Thus, by providing a
hyperlink to the terms on a page during the registration process,
regardless of the level of conspicuousness, the screens in both
Cullinane and Meyer would have provided a user with reasonable access to the terms.218 In such a standard, utilization of the
app itself would constitute a user’s manifestation of assent,
much like the all-familiar browsewrap agreements.219
C.Addressing Additional Consumer Protection
This redefined standard is not without its shortcomings.
While a learning curve is still underway for app technology, it

Id. (emphasis added).
See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2018); Meyer,
868 F.3d at 76.
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217 See id. at 74–75.
218 See supra Section II.E, Figure 1; Figure 2.
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could present issues for unknowing users.220 However, while this
standard attempts to take into account technological advancements and future learning, regulation of the language of mobile
contract terms containing arbitration clauses should be advocated
for in order to protect users with a more limited knowledge.221
For example, rather than making the terms conspicuous, terms
can be signaled by the same language across all apps, such as
“Terms and Conditions” or “Terms of Service” so that all users
know what to look for and what the language means.222 Further,
in exchange for the ability to present and design an app as a
business chooses, regulations can require that arbitration clauses
contain more consumer-friendly provisions.223
Notwithstanding any additional consumer protection,
while arbitration can become costly to the consumer, some argue
that it is “look[ing] more and more like litigation,” in that it is both
thorough and tailored.224 Moreover, if consumers become more
active in reading the terms that they are subject to, they may find
that opt-out provisions are included in such terms, to which they
can object or abstain from a provision that they do not want.225
CONCLUSION
Cullinane and Meyer reflect a current standard that allows
for different judicial interpretations of app-based contracts containing arbitration terms.226 While the FAA strongly favors enforcement of arbitration agreements, analyzing mobile contracts
for conspicuousness of terms based on a reasonable person standard
does not necessarily further this policy, depending on how much
knowledge the judge affords the “reasonable smartphone user”.227 A
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redefined standard to apply in the context of app-based terms of
service that include arbitration agreements should analyze the
app interface in terms of a reasonable app user, incorporating
such a user’s common technological knowledge and the fact that
users are reasonably aware that they are subject to terms when
they use apps.228 Taking into account this heightened knowledge,
reasonable access to the terms of a mobile app should be sufficient to satisfy inquiry notice for purposes of validating terms.229
This standard not only accounts for the current understanding
of app users but will incorporate a progressive understanding of
new and modernized technology.230 Further, it will allow businesses to tailor their mobile apps toward a more in-demand and
engaging user interface while also allowing businesses to build
their brand given that they can be less consumed with designing
solely with “conspicuous terms” in mind.231
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